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This paper examines the prehistoric shift from hunting and gathering
to agriculture. Among hunters and gatherers, all community members
were engaged in food provision. Agricultural societies, in contrast, avail
themselves of non-food specialists. This paper argues that the adoption of
agriculture necessitated the introduction of non-food specialists. Since the
release of labour from food generating activities stimultes economic devel-
opment, this implies that the shift to agriculture literally bore the seeds
of later economic growth. The model shows, in accordance with archae-
ological evidence, that hunters and gatherers, faced with redistribution
costs arising from division of labour, delay the adoption of agricultural
techniques for a period of time, after which a large step forward in food
procurement technology–a ’Neolithic revolution’–is associated with the
shift to farming.
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1”The ﬁrst revolution that transformed human economy gave man control over
his own food supply. Man began to plant, cultivate, and improve by selection
edible grasses, roots, and trees. And he succeeded in taming and ﬁrmly attaching
to his person certain species of animals in return for the fodder he was able to
oﬀer, the protection he could aﬀord, and the forethought he could exercise.”
V. Gordon Childe, Man Makes Himself, 1936
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper examines the transition from hunting and gathering to agriculture,
w h i c ha p p e a r e df o rt h eﬁrst time some 10,000 years ago. The emergence of agri-
culture is unquestionably one of the most important events in human cultural
h i s t o r y .F o rm o s to ft h et i m es i n c et h el i n eo fm a nt h a tl e dt om o d e r nh u m a n s
departed from that of the great apes around 7 million years ago, all humans
fed themselves exclusively by hunting wild animals and gathering wild plants.
The introduction of agriculture, as recognized by the eminent archeologist V.
Gordon Childe in the quotation above, meant that humans began to cultivate
plants and domesticate animals and so gained an unprecedented control over
their food supply.
Radical changes in organizational structures accompanied the adoption of
agriculture; an economy of non-food specialists–craftsmen, chiefs, bureaucrats,
and priests–arose, founded upon the surplus that early farmers were able to
create. The presence of non-food specialists led to countless innovations such
as writing, metallurgy, cities, and scientiﬁc principles, elements of what today
is known as ’civilization’.
Surprisingly though, archaeological evidence indicates that there were thou-
sands of years between the discovery of agricultural techniques and their adop-
tion. Considering the fact that cultivation techniques are time-costly, meaning
that hunters and gatherers, contrary to common belief, worked less than early
farmers, and that the transition to agriculture involved little or no increase in
standards of living, the reluctance to take up farming is hardly surprising.
This leaves a compelling question: What were the factors that eventually
tipped the competitive advantage away from hunting-gathering and towards
agriculture? This issue is subject to intense debate within the archaeological
and anthropological communities.1 It has been suggested that agriculture was
adopted in response to external pressure arising from demographic or climatic
changes, or, in the absence of outside stress, as the result of changes in cultural
behaviour. But no universally applicable theory seems to have been found yet.
This paper provides a new view on the emergence of agriculture. The work
is related to the branch of growth literature that investigates the interplay be-
tween economic and demographic variables associated with the historical tran-
1Gebauer and Price (1992) estimate that there are as many as thirty-eight distinct and
competing explanations of how farming emerged.
2sition from stagnation to growth (e.g., Galor and Weil, 2000, Galor and Moav,
2002; Goodfriend and McDermott, 1995; Hansen and Prescott, 2002; Jones,
2001; Kögel and Prskawetz, 2001; Lagerlöf, 2003; Lucas, 2002; Tamura, 2002;
Weisdorf, 2003a). Despite their long-run perspective, none of these papers fo-
cus directly on the rise of Neolithic agriculture. Some, however, recognise the
importance of the event: Galor and Moav (2002) argue that the shift from the
tribal family structure of hunters and gatherers to the household level family
organisation of agricultural societies enhanced the manifestation of the potential
evolutionary advantage of individuals with a quality-bias that favoured economic
growth; Lagerlöf (2002), who investigates the institution of serfdom, suggests
that indicates that the birth of farming may have led to an era dominated by
slavery; and Olsson and Hibbs (2003) show that the timing and the location
of the transition to agriculture is strongly correlated with the distribution of
wealth among today’s countries.
A small but growing number of papers deal speciﬁcally with the shift from
foraging to farming. Smith (1975) examines the hypothesis that the extinc-
tion of large herding animals, due to ’overkill’ by Paleolithic hunters, led to the
rise of agriculture. North and Thomas (1977) argue that population pressure,
together with the shift from common to exclusive communal property rights, al-
tered man’s incentive suﬃciently to encourage the application of cultivation and
domestication techniques. Locay (1989) studies the implications of nomadism
versus sedentarism in relation to the rise of agriculture. More recently, Morand
(2002) has presented a model that discusses the family’s resource-allocation be-
haviour in relation to the shift to farming, while Olsson (2003), in a framework
that is able to compare a number of archaeological explanations, supports the
theory that environmental factors, along with genetic changes in the species
suitable for domestication, paved the way for agriculture.2
The factors that eventually tipped the comparative advantage in favour of
agriculture in this paper diﬀer essentially from those presented in the existing
literature. First and foremost, we challenge the idea that external pressure is
needed to have hunters and gatherers embarking upon time-costly agricultural
techniques. Instead, we argue that organizational change in the form of a divi-
sion of the labour force into food and non-food specialists, driven by exogenous
improvements in food procurement technology, was the prime factor behind the
shift. The reason is that the goods produced by the non-food specialists com-
pensated for the loss of leisure associated with the adoption of more productive
but also more time-costly food procurement methods. The argument rests upon
two empirically well-established elements: One is that the individual’s learning
time associated with the application of a given food procurement method in-
creases with the method’s productivity. The other is that the demand for food
is income-inelastic and that individuals, once their food needs are fulﬁlled, care
about leisure and non-food goods, which they consider to be substitute.
We also show that redistribution costs arising from the division of labour
will delay the adoption of agricultural techniques, despite the existence of the
2See Weisdorf (2003b) for a more detailed survey of these papers.
3knowledge about how to use them. Under such circumstances, a period of
technical stagnation is followed by a shift to considerably more productive food
procurement methods, resembling the perception of a ’Neolithic revolution’.
The ideas presented in this paper carries an important message with regards
to the emergence of economic growth. The process of industrialisation, which
has been particularly fast in the western world during the past two centuries, and
which has been the impetus for modern economic growth, relies on the release
of labour from food into non-food generating activities. If the emergence of
non-food specialists is closely linked to the adoption of agriculture, the shift
from foraging to farming in the Stone Age therefore literally bears the seeds of
the later process of industrialisation.
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 outlines the archaeological evi-
dence upon which the model is based; section 3 presents the model, section 4
performs the analysis, and section 5 concludes.
2 Archaeological Evidence
A tenet common among archaeologists and anthropologists is that the knowledge
about how to practise agricultural techniques was present for a long time prior
to their adoption (e.g., Harlan, 1995; Diamond, 1997; Milthen, 1996; Redman,
1978). Following Milthen (1996, p. 218), ”the origins of agriculture 10,000 years
ago are not to be sought in a sudden breakthrough in technology, or the crossing
of a threshold in botanical knowledge”. Along similar lines, Harlan (1995, p.
15) asserts that ”[i]f the hunter-gatherers chose to grow a plant from seed, they
would do so and no new knowledge was required”. He claims (loc.cit.)t h a t
”[h]unter-gatherers knew all they needed to know to take up agriculture at any
time and, within economically suitable limits, at any place they chose”. But
according to Redman (1978), the advantages of agriculture were not obvious at
the outset (pp. 91-92), ... ”it seems that there were from several hundred to
several thousand years between the ﬁrst domestication of plants and animals in
any given area and a heavy reliance by the people in that area on agriculture
for food”. Thus in actuality, the shift to agriculture is regarded as innovation
rather than invention.3
The apparent reluctance towards agricultural techniques is believed to have
been partly due to the fact that farming has greater labour costs than hunting
and gathering. Time budget studies of present-day primitive societies show,
to most peoples’ surprise, that hunters and gatherers spent fewer rather than
more hours per day at work compared to early farmers (Boserup, 1965; Lee and
DeVore, 1968; Sahlins, 1974). In fact, Sahlins (1974) argues convincingly that
hunters and gatherers were the most leisured people in history. Based on the
studies that he refers to, he notes (p. 14) that, among hunter-gatherers, ”rather
3Delaying the introduction of agriculture is not conﬁned to the ﬁrst people who adopted
it. There is a famous example from northern Germany where hunters and gatherers, situated
no more than 125 miles north of farming societies, did not adopt agriculture until 1,300 years
after the techniques were introduced by their southern neighbours (e.g., Diamond, 1997).
4than continuous travail, the food quest is intermittent, leisure abundant, and
there is a greater amount of sleep in the daytime per capita per year than
in any other society”. In support of Sahlins’ statement, the studies found in
Lee and DeVore (1968) leave one with the impression that early farming was
indeed back-breaking, time consuming, and labour intensive, which makes it
diﬃcult to believe that agriculture was adopted in order to save time or labour.
Or as Fernandez-Armesto (2001) puts it (p. 93), ”if labour-saving was the
purpose behind the strategy, crop domestication must be reckoned a failure. In
practice, it seems always to have cost early farmers more trouble than it saved”.
These issues add doubt to whether the implementation of agriculture is in fact
compatible with the principle of least eﬀort.
It seems perfectly sound to argue that hunters and gatherers would not
embark upon time-costly methods of food procurement unless there was good
reason to do so. Thus, some sort of imbalance must have generated the shift.
Archaeologists and anthropologists have speculated extensively about the ori-
gins of such an imbalance.4 One can roughly divide the many theories into
those that have external changes as the cause of the imbalance and those where
the changes are internal, resulting from the actions taken by the societies them-
selves.
One of the major theories concerning external factors builds on ideas pro-
posed by Boserup (1965). Boserup attributes the development of intensive agri-
culture to the impetus given by a growing population. In response to the pres-
sure that a larger population puts on its resources, farmers increase their labour
input to produce more food per unit of land. As the increasingly intensive
land use supposedly leads to a drop in labour productivity, methods that raise
productivity, such as ploughing and fertilization, are developed.
The introduction of such methods, however, belongs to a period in time
where agriculture had already gained a foothold. In order to include develop-
m e n tb e f o r et h er i s eo fa g r i c u l t u r e ,C o h e n(1977) therefore extended the theories
of Boserup. According to his version, communities of hunters and gatherers con-
tinually evolved towards higher and higher carrying capacity in order to accom-
modate recurrent population pressure. Cohen, along with fellow archaeologists
such as Binford (1968) and Flannery (1973), thus believes that the increasing
need to increase food supplies paved the way for agriculture.
The population pressure theory is challenged by theories that attribute the
rise of agriculture to environmental changes. It is argued that population pres-
sure could not have been an important factor because there is no evidence of
a food crisis prior to the rise of farming (see, e.g., Harlan, 1995 and Milthen,
1996). Instead, it is assumed that the communities remain in equilibrium with
carrying capacity, unless disturbed by factors in the environment. According
to this view, agriculture was adopted in the early Holocene as a consequence of
a period of unusual environmental change (e.g., Bar-Yosef and Benfer-Cohen,
1992; Byrne, 1987; Childe, 1935).
T h ew e a k n e s so ft h e o r i e st h a td e a lw i t he xternal pressure is that agriculture
4See Weisdorf (2003b) for a brief survey.
5seems to have been introduced regardless of whether or not such changes were
present (e.g., Fernandez-Armesto, 2001). This has led to a number of theories
that emphasise internal changes, based on alterations in cultural behaviour.
Hayden (1990), for example, regards food as a source of social prestige, and
envisions the rise of agriculture as resulting from what he calls ’competitive
feasting’. He argues that early domestication took place in order to create
delicacies for families or individuals who wanted to improve their social status.
There also seems to be interest in the idea that agriculture was introduced as a
response to religion (e.g., Cauvin, 2000; Harlan, 1992, 1995) or due to changes
in the capacity of the modern man’s mind (Milthen, 1996).
Though many of the theories presented in the archaeological and anthro-
pological literature ﬁt well on a regional level, no single explanation seems to
be universally applicable (e.g., Harlan, 1995; Smith, 1995; Fernandez-Armesto,
2001). However, the fact that agriculture was adopted even in the absence of ex-
ternal pressure makes a general theory more likely to rely on changes within the
societies themselves; changes that are based upon incidents that are universally
observable.
One of the world-wide fundamental changes that accompanied the adoption
of agriculture was the appearance of non-food specialists (e.g., Diamond, 1997;
Redman, 1978). According to Diamond (1997, p. 55), hunters and gatherers
did not produce food surpluses and so did not support and feed non-hunting
craft specialists, bureaucrats, and chiefs. But with agriculture, Diamond says
(p. 261), ”it became possible, for the ﬁrst time in human evolution, to develop
economically specialized societies consisting of non-food producing specialists
fed by food-producing peasants”.
Below we promote the idea that the introduction of non-food specialists made
possible the adoption of time-intensive agricultural methods. We also argue that
the costs of having a division of labour arising, for example, from the collection
and redistribution of food and other goods between sectors and individuals,
delayed the adoption of agricultural methods despite their accessibility.
3 The Model
In this section a simple economic model of primitive societies, which oﬀers a
framework for analysing the issue discussed above, is presented.
In contrast to the models found in, for example, Olsson (2003) and Morand
(2002), in which hunting-gathering and agriculture are characterized as two dis-
tinctly diﬀerent food procurement methods, the model presented in this paper
has no such boundary distinction.5 Instead, in line with widely accepted ideas
among archaeologists, we imagine a ladder of technical steps ranging from for-
aging to farming (e.g., Smith, 2001). Each step implies a higher availability of
5In Olsson’s model there are decreasing returns to labour among hunter-gatherers but
constant returns to agriculture. In Morand’s model, human capital can be accumulated by
farmers, an option that does not exist for hunter-gatherers.
6food per acre of land, but simultaneously implies an increase in the amount of
time or energy required for its use.
The traditional way of characterising foraging techniques–the one which we
do not use here–is to consider the source of food on which hunters and gatherers
subsist as constant. From this traditional perspective, moving one step up the
technical ladder means that food can be obtained with greater certainty, or with
less time or energy invested; but the size of the supply of food, which depends,
so to speak, on nature’s rather than man’s decision, remains the same.
In the more contemporary approach–the one that our model builds on–
hunters and gatherers are in fact able to inﬂuence the size of their food supply.6
This means that the line between the techniques that belong to foraging and
those that belong to farming becomes somewhat blurred. Consider, for example,
a hunter-gatherer community that subsists on grasses such as wheat or barley.
Am o v ef r o mm e r e l yﬁnding and reaping wild grasses to removing competing
vegetation surrounding it would constitute a step up the technical ladder to-
wards farming. However, it is not normally considered as such. A step up the
ladder into farming methods involves land clearing and cultivation where no
grasses formerly grew.7 Likewise, hunter-gatherer communities, subsisting on,
say, reindeers, can increase the reindeer population by eliminating its natural
enemies (other than humans). Such interventions that, as with grasses, increase
the supply of food, are a step towards domestication, but are normally not
considered as such. Domestication requires that the populations of animals on
which humans subsist, depend on human assistance for their survival.
Both the grass and the reindeer examples stress that in the contemporary
view, hunter-gatherers were not exclusively dependent upon nature for the size
of their food supply. The examples also indicate why moving one step up the
technical ladder involves an increase in time or energy invested in applying
the method, regardless of whether the method is considered to be foraging or
farming.
It is generally agreed that when new and more intensive food procurement
methods, for whatever reasons, occurred, Stone Age communities evaluated the
results of deploying the diﬀerent methods. Considering the time and energy
aspects suggested above, foraging techniques may have been preferred despite
the knowledge of more intensive methods. Below we try to formalise the process
of evaluation.
3.1 The Community
Consider a population consisting of N identical individuals who form a single,
egalitarian community. By egalitarian we mean that all members of the com-
6Australian Aboriginals, for instance, who are classiﬁed as hunters and gatherers, burn oﬀ
vegetation to encourage the growth of the species of grasses that they depend on for food at
the expense of other plants (e.g., Smith, 1995).
7More precisely, a step up the ladder into farming methods requires the use of domesticated
grasses. According to Smith’s (1995) deﬁnition, a ’domesticate’ is the human creation of a
new form of plant (or animal) that is identiﬁably diﬀerent from its wild ancestor.
7munity work the same amount of time and that all goods produced are divided
equally between the members. The community’s population is assumed to be
constant over time and so is the amount of land controlled by the community.
We consider a one-period, non-overlapping generations model, meaning that, at
the beginning of each period, the old generation is replaced by a new one of a
similar size.
Although demographic changes certainly seem to have occurred in relation
to the rise of agriculture (see, e.g., Diamond, 1997), the purpose of this model is
to show, in accordance with archaeological evidence, that agriculture could have
been adopted even in the absence of demographic (or for that matter climatic)
changes.8 For an exposition that deals speciﬁcally with demographic changes
in relation to the rise of agriculture, see Olsson (2003).
3.2 Food Procurement
With NF
t   N individuals in food procurement (superscript F for food), who
each work for nt hours, and with X units of land, the community’s total food












, α ∈ (0,1),X≡ 1. (1)
The variable Bt measures the total factor productivity of the food procurement
method that is applied by the community in period t. Note that having decided
on a method of food procurement (see further below), thus holding Bt constant,
the assumption that α ∈ (0,1) means that there are diminishing returns to
labour, which is due to the fact that only a limited amount of land is available
or accessible to the members of the community.
Suppose that new and more productive food procurement methods are grad-
ually added to the stock of methods that the community can choose among.9
More speciﬁcally, we assume that the variable At, which measures the total fac-
tor productivity of the cutting-edge technology, i.e., the most productive method
available at the beginning of period t, grows exogenously at a non-decreasing
rate.10 In addition, we assume that the choice of food procurement method is
a once in a life-time decision that is made at the beginning of each life-period.
As time passes, new generations of the community’s population are thus able
to employ still more productive food procurement methods. But the familiarity
8Milthen (1996) and Harlan (1995), for example, both argue that the idea of a food crises
prior to the rise of agriculture, broad about by demographic or environmental pressure, is no
longer convincing.
9Rather than being intentional, improvements in food procurement technology in the Stone
Age were probably incidental; human latrines, for example, may have been an unconscious
testing ground of the ﬁrst crop breeders, as suggested by Diamond (1997).
10Olsson (2003), in a manner similar to ours, assumes that the productivity in food produc-
tion among primitive societies is an increasing function of time. One could also imagine that
improvements in food procurement technology arose from learning-by-doing. For example, the
arrival of new technology could be an increasing function of the total food output, in which
case improvements in technology would occur in an endogenous manner. Such a construction,
however, would aﬀect neither the qualitative nor the quantitative results of the model.
8with methods that are more productive than the one used by the previous
generation does not necessarily lead to a technical replacement. The reason is
that the application of more productive methods requires an increase in time
spent learning how to practise the method (see below). Hence, the level of
applied technology, whose productivity is measured by the variable Bt,i se q u a l
to, or below, the productivity level of the cutting-edge technology, At.T h a ti s ,
Bt   At. (2)
In other words, invention and innovation do not necessarily go hand in hand.11
3.3 Time Consumption and leisure
Individual time spent in food procurement is divided into two types of activi-
ties. The ﬁrst type of activity is learning, which involves time spent becoming
acquainted with a certain food procurement method. The second type of activ-
ity concerns regular work, i.e., the time during which the acquired method is
applied in order to procure food, denoted nt (see equation (1) above).
Anthropological studies of present-day primitive societies indicate that the
time required to become acquainted with a certain food procurement method
increases with the method’s productivity (e.g., Bird and Bird, 2002; Blok, 2002).
Suppose, therefore, that when applying a method with a total factor productiv-
ity equal to Bt, it requires a number of individual learning hours equal to
et = φB
γ
t ≡ e(Bt), φ > 0, γ ∈ (0,1). (3)
Having γ ∈ (0,1) indicates that learning time increases at a diminishing rate
with the method’s productivity. Note the indivisibility associated with the learn-
ing process: If the time devoted to learning a given method is less than the time
required to master that methods, the method cannot be learnt and used; instead,
less productive methods, requiring less learning, are applied.12
11Mokyr (1990, 2002) provides examples of inventions that were made available during
t h eM i d d l eA g e so re v e ni nt h ec l a s s i c a la n t i q u i t y ,t h a tw e r en o ta d o p t e du n t i lt h et i m eo f
the Industrial Revolution. Note that the use of the term ’invention’ not necessarily implies
that the knowledge of more productive methods exclusively stems from inventiveness. The
dispersion of information from community to community may also have been a source of new
knowledge. Therefore, the results of the model are not conﬁned to the people who invented
agricultural techniques. I thank George Grantham for pointing this out.
12Two coastal foraging techniques–shellﬁsh collection and spearﬁshing–may illustrate the
point. Gathering shellﬁsh is perceptually easy; children from a very early age are able to
participate in such a food quest. Spearﬁshing, on the other hand, which is a more produc-
tive method, i.e., generates a larger amount of food per unit of time once the method is
learnt, requires intensive, method-speciﬁct r a i n i n g . T h el e a r n i n gp r o c e s sh e r ei st h u sm o r e
time-consuming than that needed to gather shellﬁsh. Moreover, the methods are distinctly
diﬀerent: one cannot upgrade one’s learning from shellﬁsh collecting to spearﬁshing; the
shellﬁsh-gatherer is practically a novice concerning spearﬁshing and must start his or her
learning from scratch. The relationship between learning time and the complexity of food
procurement methods among primitive people has been profoundly studied in the anthropo-
logical literature; for recent discussions and empirical observations, see Blok (2002) and Bird
and Bird (2002).
9Having learnt how to practise a given food procurement method, each indi-
vidual supplies a number of work hours, nt, in order to obtain a given amount
of food. To procure at ≡ Y F
t /N F
t units of food, each individual, according to
















Due to the egalitarian nature of the community, and to the similarities in
individual preferences (see below), all individuals engaged in food procurement
end up learning and applying the same method.
The individual’s leisure time consists of the total number of hours available
to the individual, symbolically denoted n, minus his learning time, et,a n dt h e
time he spends in food procurement, nt. Leisure time, therefore, is












In accordance with Craft (1985), we assume that the demand for food, unlike
other goods that we consider, is income-inelastic.13 More speciﬁcally, we assume
that having consumed a number of food units equal to a, utility is derived from
leisure time, lt,a sw e l la sn o n - f o o dg o o d s ,mt, as speciﬁed in the utility function:
ut (lt,m t)=l
β
t (1 + mt)
1−β , β ∈ (0,1). (6)
Non-food goods can be thought of as daily consumption goods such as
houses, clothing, cooking tools, pottery for storage, etc. Or as more luxurious
goods such as pearls and other kinds of ornaments; goods aimed at sweetening
the value of the individual’s leisure time. Interpreted in a more broad sense,
non-food goods may also consist of protection and salvation. As will become
apparent below, non-food goods, in the case that these are consumed, are pro-
duced by non-food specialists.
Note that a positive level of utility can be obtained from consuming leisure
exclusively. Note also that the consumption of the a units of food does not
provide any utility but is necessary for survival.14
3.5 Non-Food Production
In the analysis below, we will consider both the case where every member of the
community is engaged in food provision, which characterises foraging societies,
and the case where the community’s labour force is divided into food and non-
food specialists, which characterises agricultural societies.
13Adam Smith (1776, p. 164) perhaps said it most precisely, noting that ”[t]he desire for
food is limited in every man by the narrow capacities of the human stomach but the desire of
the conveniences and ornaments of buildings, dress, equipage, and household furniture, seems
to have no limit or certain boundary”.
14A similar construction is found in Kögel and Prskawetz (2001).
103.5.1 Non-Food Specialists
What does a division of the labour force into food and non-food specialists
involve in terms of this model? The presence of non-food specialists means that
some of the community members who would otherwise provide their own food
are exclusively engaged in non-food production. Non-food specialists, therefore,
depend upon those that are engaged in food procurement for the food that
they need for survival. In exchange for this food, food producers thus require
a compensation in terms of non-food goods for their loss of leisure associated
with their additional food output.
We denote the number of non-food producers in period t as NNF
t (superscript




Equilibrium in the market for food means the total food demand, aN,e q u a l s
the total food supply, atNF
t . This implies that the number of food producers in
relation to the entire population is NF
t =( a/at) · N. The number of non-food
specialists, supported by the food producers, is thus
NNF
t =( 1− a/at) · N. (7)
Note that when a food producer’s food output, at, exceeds his satiation level,
a, the community is capable of supporting non-food specialists. This, however,
is no guarantee that a division of labour is eﬀectuated. We also need to make
s u r et h a tt h er a t ea tw h i c ht h ef o o dp r o d u c e rw i s h e st ot r a d eo ﬀ leisure for non-
food goods corresponds to the rate at which his food surplus, at − a, attained
by decreasing his leisure time, is converted into non-food goods. We will return
to this matter in the analysis below.
3.5.2 Non-Food Production Technology
Suppose that non-food goods are produced using constant returns to labour
technology. The total number of non-food goods, when the community avail
itself of non-food specialists, is thus
Y NF
t = ν (nt + et)NNF
t , ν > 0, (8)
where ν measures non-food productivity. Since we abstract from the learning
process associated with non-food goods production, and for individuals to be
indiﬀerent between employment in the food and in the non-food sector, non-food
producers, as do their food producing colleagues, work for nt plus et hours.
3.5.3 Costs of Redistribution
Whereas communities that divide their labour force into food and non-food
specialists need a system of goods transfer, i.e., the collection and redistribution
of food and other stuﬀs between sectors and individuals, societies in which all
11members of the community participate in the food quest need no such system
(see, e.g., Diamond, 1997, Ch. 14).
The collection and redistribution associated with the division of the labour
force between food and non-food activities therefore calls for an amount of
redistribution costs that societies with no division of labour are not exposed
to. Accordingly, we will assume that the costs of redistribution associated with
the existence of the two-sector economy are π > 0 units of non-food goods per
individual per generation.
4A n a l y s i s
Considering the shift to agriculture as a transition from low-productive into
high-productive methods of food procur e m e n t ,a si sd o n ei nt h i sp a p e r ,m a k e s
it diﬃcult to distinguish those technologies that belong to foraging from those
that belong to farming. In order to create a point of reference, we will apply
two commonly accepted archaeological theories. First, as discussed on page 6,
archaeological evidence indicates that non-food specialists are seldom found in
societies that embark upon foraging techniques. Second, as discussed on page
4, archaeological evidence indicates that foragers were the most leisured people
in history. In consequence, we therefore propose that the level of technology
that maximises the individual’s leisure time when everyone is engaged in food
provision will be characterised as a foraging method. Using this method, there
are thus no non-food specialists in equilibrium.
The optimization problem for an individual engaged in food procurement is
min
Bt






subject to the food constraint that at     a; to the occupational constraint that
NF
t   N; to the time-budget constraint that nt +et   n, and to the technology




















Equation (10) says that the marginal utility obtained from embarking on a more
productive method, thus being able to decrease the time it takes to acquire at
units of food, in optimum equals the marginal utility forgone from spending
more time learning how to practise this method.15
From equation (10), it follows that if the method could be chosen freely,
i.e., disregarding the technology constraint in equation (2), then the leisure-
























> 0. For foraging communities in which every member is
engaged in food provision, the leisure-maximising technology is thus B∗
t =
B∗ (a,N).16
Note that while the adoption of a more productive method below the leisure-
maximizing level is leisure-increasing, the implementation of more productive
methods above the leisure-maximizing level requires an unequivocal increase in
the total time spend obtaining a given amount of food. That is, the increase in
learning time associated with the adoption of a more intensive method eventu-
ally becomes so pronounced that it dominates the time-saving eﬀect on the time
it takes to procure a given amount of food once the method is learned. Adopt-
ing a more productive method above the leisure-maximizing level is, therefore,
leisure-decreasing.
It thus immediately follows that when cutting-edge technology, At,i sb e l o w
the leisure-maximizing level, cutting-edge technology is adopted at once (this
is formalised in Corollary 1 below). At the same time, we see the cause of the
reluctance among hunters and gatherers towards more productive food procure-
ment methods, as their implementation decreases the individual’s leisure time.
It is the latter fact that seems to puzzle archaeologists and anthropologists, and
is the reason why it has been suggested that the adoption of time-costly agri-
cultural techniques was a result of external pressure arising from demographic
or climatic changes (see the introductionary section).
It appears, however, that archaeologists and anthropologists overlook the
individual’s willingness to trade oﬀ leisure for non-food goods. The willingness
to practise leisure-decreasing methods, in this model, requires that utility is
somehow increased, or, at least, maintained. Hence, accordi n gt oh i sp r e f e r -
ences, the forager decreases his leisure time in order to adopt a methods that is
more productive than the leisure-maximizing level, only if compensated for his
loss of leisure in terms of non-food goods. With learning involved in the food
procurement process, we thus arrive at the following conclusion.
Lemma 1 If NNF
t =0when Bt = B∗ (a,N),t h e nBt >B ∗ (a,N) requires
NNF
t > 0 in equilibrium.
Proof Since B∗ is the leisure-maximising method, it follows that for B   B∗,
lB < 0.S i n c e (ul,u m) > 0, the goods of non-food specialists are required to
compensate for the decline in utility from using a leisure-decreasing method.
 .
16The fact that the leisure-maximising method varies with the size of the community’s
population implies, according to our characterisation, that relatively large communities in
which everyone is in food provision use methods that are closer to those of agriculture than does
communities with relatively small populations. The diﬃculties of drawing a sharp line between
foraging and farming is also found in the archaeological literature (e.g., Smith, 2001, p. 1), in
which the term ’middle ground’ is used as ”the deﬁnitional and developmental ’no-man’s land’
that stretches between hunter-gatherer-foragers, with economies based exclusively on wild
plants and animals, on one side, and agriculturalists, who strongly depend on domesticated
species as food sources, on the other”. The leisure-maximising method discussed in this model
is considered to belong to this ’middle ground’.
13Lemma 1 provides a key statement in this paper. What the Lemma basically
says is that since individuals care about leisure and non-food goods, then if
foragers should ever accept the adoption of leisure-decreasing methods, it must
be the case that a separate sector of non-food producers emerges in order to
compensate for the longer work hours associated with these methods.17 But
under what circumstances will the community undergo such a reorganization?
And what postpones the adoption of leisure-decreasing methods despite their
accessibility? The remaining part of the paper deals with these questions.
4.1 The Rise of Agriculture
In accordance with archaeological evidence, our point of departure is a situa-
tion where everyone is engaged in food provision (i.e., NF = N); where each
individual, therefore, produces food for himself only (i.e., a = a); and where the
most leisured method associated with the individual’s satiation of his food needs
is applied (i.e., B = B∗ (a,N)). In accordance with the evidence presented in
Diamond (1997) and Sahlins (1974), we thus consider a community of hunters
and gatherers.
In the following, we identify the levels of At, above the leisure-maximizing
level, at which non-food specialists are present. In other word, we investigate
under what circumstances the community of hunters and gatherers is capable
of adopting methods that are more productive but also more time-costly than
the leisure-maximizing level; methods that we consequently identify as being
agricultural.
Keeping in mind that the costs of redistribution must be covered, the pres-
ence of non-food specialists in equilibrium requires that the rate at which food
producers wish to trade oﬀ leisure for non-food goods exceeds the rate at which
their food surplus, at −a, attained by decreasing their leisure, is converted into
non-food goods. To simplify matters we divide the issue into two separate ques-
tions: First, how many non-food goods will an individual ask for in exchange for
the loss of leisure associated with the adoption of a leisure-decreasing method
used to produce a food surplus of a certain amount? And second, how much
is the non-food goods sector, which is supported by the food sector’s surplus,
then able to supply?
Consider, in regards to the former question, the following options: Either
the individual applies the leisure-maximizing method, providing food for himself
only and consuming no non-food goods (i.e., the individual is a forager). Or he
produces a food surplus, at > a, applying a method with a higher productivity
17One could also imagine that individuals would agree to longer work hours in exchange
for technologies that allow a more sedentary life-style. Since the nomadic life-style, with its
constant or periodic travelling, does not complement the possession of (material) non-food
goods (as mentioned by Sahlins, 1974), farmers should derive more utility from non-food
goods than do nomadic foragers. I thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. It is
beyond the scope of this model, however, to consider the relationship between technologies
and degrees of sedentariness. For an exposition that deals formally with this matter, see Locay
(1989).
14than the leisure-maximizing method while consuming a positive amount of non-
food goods (i.e., the individual is a farmer).
From the utility function, equation (6), we ﬁnd that the individual is in-
diﬀerent between the two alternatives when he receives an amount of non-food











− 1 ≡ mc (at,B t,N), (12)
where, for at > a, (mc
a,m c
aa) > 0;w h e r e ,f o rBt >B ∗, mc
B > 0;a n dw h e r e
mc
N > 0.18 Inserting equation (7) into (8), each individual, due to the egalitarian
nature of the community, accordingly receives a number of non-food goods equal









(1 − a/at) ≡ ms (at,B t,N), (13)
where, for at > a, (ms
a,−ms
aa) > 0;w h e r e ,f o rBt >B ∗, ms
B > 0;a n dw h e r e
ms
N > 0. Examining at what levels of At above the leisure-maximizing level
that non-food specialists are present in equilibrium thus corresponds to ﬁnding
the levels of At at which ms
t − π >m c
t,w h e r eπ is the individual’s costs of
redistribution associated with the two-sector economy.19
To be used below, deﬁne the function σ such that
σ(ξ)=( 1 /a)
1/(1−α) ((n/ρ) − ξβ/(1 − β))
1+αγ/(1−α)γ ,
where ρ ≡ φ(αφγ)−αγ/(1+αγ) +( αφγ)1/(1+αγ). Consider the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 Assume that N<σ(ξ1),w h e r eξ1 ≡ (αγφ)1/(1+αγ)/νρ2. Then there
exits a level of food output per food producer, a  > a,w h e r e∂ms (a ,B∗ (a,N),N)/∂at =
∂mc (a ,B∗ (a,N),N)/∂at, and a unique level of redistribution costs,   π > 0,
such that for π >   π, ms (a ,B∗ (a,N),N) − π <m c (a ,B∗ (a,N),N).
Proof See Appendix A.  .
The statement in Lemma 2 is illustrated in Figure 1. The Figure shows that
with technology at the leisure-maximising level and redistribution costs equal to
  π, the members of the community are indiﬀerent between satisfying only their
own food needs, having no non-food specialists, and generating an individual
food surplus equal to a  −a, supporting non-food specialists. Indiﬀerence arises
because, by the deﬁnition of   π, non-food specialists are exactly able cover both
the costs of redistribution and the individual’s compensation associated with the
loss of leisure that arises from generating an amount of food equal to a  rather
18Note that implicitly we have used the fact that equilibrium in the food market implies
that NF
t =( a/at)N. This is also the case in equation 13 below.
19For convenience, we assume that the π units of non-food goods that it costs per individual
to collect and redistribute the goods in the two-sector economy are ’shoeleather costs’ in the
sense that in order to collect and redistribute the goods, the π units of non-food goods vanish.
15than a. It thus follows that when the leisure-maximising method is applied,
communities that are subject to costs of redistribution that exceed   π will have
no non-food specialists in equilibrium.
[Figure 1 about here: The Characterisation of   π]
F i g u r e1a l s os h o w st h a ti ft h e r ew e r en o redistribution costs, non-food spe-
cialists would exist in the foraging community for all at ∈ (a,a  ]. This becomes
evident when comparing the dashed ms-curve to the solid mc-curve. The ex-
istence of this interval of food surpluses, which allows a division of the labour
force between food and non-food activities, is ensured by holding the population
density below the limitation in the Lemma. When the density of the commu-
nity’s population is suﬃciently small, a decline in the leisure time arising from
an increase in the food output per individual in food provision has a smaller
impact on the individual’s demand for compensation than on its non-food sup-
ply. Implicitly, the reason is that when the community’s population is relatively
small, individuals have a relatively large amount of leisure at their disposal.
Due to a diminishing marginal rate of substitution, individuals therefore ask for
a relatively small amount of non-food goods in exchange for one unit of leisure.
This is why the slope of the compensation curve, as illustrated in Figure 1, is
relatively ﬂat when departing from a.
With Lemma 2 in mind, consider the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Let a  and   π (deﬁned in Lemma 2) be given and let δ > 0.
Assume that σ(ξ2) <N ,w h e r eξ2 =1 /νρ. Then there exists π ∈ (  π,  π + δ)
and functions µ(π) > ε(π) > 0,w h e r e(επ,−µπ) > 0 and where µ(  π + δ)=
ε(  π + δ), such that for any At ∈ (B∗ (a,N)+ε(π),B∗ (a,N)+µ(π)), ms (a ,A t,N)−
π >m c (a ,A t,N).
Proof See Appendix B.  .
Proposition 1 says that there are levels of redistribution costs that pre-
vent the introduction of non-food specialists when using the leisure-maximising
method (i.e., π >   π) and hence also when using methods that are less produc-
tive than the leisure-maximising one, but allow their introduction within a given
interval of leisure-decreasing methods somewhat above the leisure-maximising
level.20
The intuition behind the statement in Proposition 1 can be obtained from
considering Figure 2. In Figure 1, technology was held constant at the leisure-
maximising level while the food output per food producer varied. In Figure 2,
the level of food output is held constant at a  > a, while the level of technology
varies. Equivalent to Figure 1, Figure 2 shows that with Bt = B∗ (a,N);w i t h
a  > a;a n dw i t hπ =   π, the supply of non-food goods minus redistribution costs
exactly match the demand for compensation. This follows from comparing the
dashed supply curve with the compensation curve. However, for redistribution
20Note that by ’adoptable’ methods is meant that compared to the leisure-maximising level,
a particular method within the ’adoptable’ interval yields at least the same level of utility.
16costs that exceed   π, the supply of non-food goods minus redistribution costs
fall below the demand for compensation at B∗ (a,N), meaning that using this
method there are no non-food specialists in equilibrium. This becomes evident
when comparing the solid supply curve with the compensation curve.
The illustration in Figure 2 suggests that for redistribution costs, π >   π,
that are not too larger, the leisure-decreasing methods just above the method
that maximises leisure, are unadoptable. Methods within this interval, though
more productive than the leisure-maximising level, cannot generate a total food
surplus large enough to support a non-food sector, which, in turn, is capable
of covering both redistribution costs and individual compensation. Since for
these methods division of labour is unattainable, then, following Lemma 1,
the leisure-maximising method continues to be applied, i.e., there is technical
stagnation. This, in accordance with archaeological evidence, means that the
foraging community is familiar with agricultural methods that they nevertheless
decide not to adopt.
[Figure 2 about here: Leisure-Decreasing Technologies with at = a ]
However, being exposed to more and more productive methods of food pro-
curement, food producers, in case they decide to adopt the methods, become
increasingly eﬀective. For redistribution costs above   π that are not too larger
(i.e., below   π+δ), an interval of leisure-decreasing methods eventually is reached,
at which the food sector, by putting these methods into practise, is capable of
supporting a non-food sector on a scale that is able to cover both the costs of
redistribution and demand for compensation (see Figure 2). Using these meth-
ods, both sectors are so eﬃcient, and individuals so moderate in their demand
for compensation, that a pareto improvement area (the shaded zone in Figure 2)
occurs, causing an increase in individual utility compared to that from applying
the leisure-maximising method. For that reason, these methods are adoptable.
Note that at the moment the interval of adoptable methods is reached, there
is a signiﬁcant increase in the productivity of the applied method. Accordingly,
after a period of technical stagnation, the community experiences a technical
revolution, reﬂecting the perception among archaeologists of a ’Neolithic revo-
lution’.
The dynamic properties of the model are summarised in the following corol-
lary to Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 Let a , π ∈ (  π,  π + δ), ε(π),a n dµ(π) (deﬁned in Lemma 2 and
Proposition 1) be given and let At grow at a non-decreasing rate. Then,
(i) for At   B∗ (a,N), Bt = At, which implies that Bt grows at the rate of
At.
(ii) for At ∈ (B∗ (a,N),B∗ (a,N)+ε(π)), Bt = B∗ (a,N).
(iii) for At   B∗ (a,N)+ε(π), Bt = At, which implies that Bt once again
grows at the rate of At,a sl o n ga sms
t+1 (a ,A t,N) − ms
t (a ,A t,N)  
mc
t+1 (a ,A t,N) − mc
t (a ,A t,N).
17Corollary 1 follows from Lemma 2 and Proposition 1. Implicitly, item (i) in
the Corollary says that a community of foragers increase their leisure time by
adopting the more productive foraging methods the moment that these occur.
Item (ii), however, states that a point will be reached at which the foragers con-
tinue to use a foraging technique, despite the knowledge about more productive
but also more time-costly methods. Finally, item (iii) suggests that the for-
agers eventually abandon the leisurely foraging method in favour of agricultural
methods that are more productive. This happens at a cost to leisure which is
being compensated for by the goods produced in the simultaneously emerging
non-food goods sector. Note that the restriction in (iii) implies that the applied
method remains at the cutting-edge level, as long as the increase in the demand
for compensation does not exceed the increase in the supply; that is, as long as
utility increases as a result of the adoption of more productive methods.21
[Table 1 about here: Parameter Values]
As mentioned above, Figure 2 can help illustrate the intuition behind the
result. Since the leisure-maximising method increases with the food output per
food producer, at, it follows (see appendix B) that when at = a  > a,t h el e v e l




>B ∗ (a,N).T h i s
means that as cutting-edge technology, departing from B∗ (a,N), improves over




is reached, increase their leisure time by
putting these methods into practise. This in turn enables them to lower their
demand for compensation, and is why the compensation curve in Figure 2, to
begin with, slopes downward. Since, with these technologies, labour time is also
lower in the non-food sector, the supply curve, to begin with, slopes downward
as well. However, when the density of the community’s population is suﬃciently
large–that is, when it exceeds the limitation in Proposition 1–changes in the
leisure time arising from changes in technology, have a smaller impact on the
individual’s non-food supply than on the demand for compensation.22 More
precisely, the impact on the individual’s non-food goods supply of an increase
in leisure is independent of the size of the community’s population, while the im-
pact on the individual’s demand for compensation of an increase in leisure grows
with the size of the community’s population. Due to a diminishing marginal
rate of substitution, this means that individuals in relatively large communities,
having relatively little leisure time at their disposal, demand a relatively large
compensation in exchange for a unit of leisure. Thus, departing from B∗ (a,N),
the absolute slope of the compensation curve is larger than that of the supply
curve. Hence, when more productive methods eventually become available, the
21Due to a diminishing marginal rate of substitution, the loss of leisure becomes increasingly
diﬃcult to compensate. One can think of this as being the reason why time-saving implements,
such as animal power, were eventually introduced (see, e.g., Boserup, 1965). As we abstract
from the use of capital goods in the production of output, it is outside the scope of this model
to consider such eﬀects.
22This argumentation is similar to that made on page 16, mutatis mutandis.
18scope for covering both redistribution costs and compensation increases.23
[Figure 3 about here: Leisure-Decreasing Technologies]
Using a numerical example, which is based upon parameter values from
T a b l e1 ,F i g u r e3s h o w st h a tt h e r ea r em o r el e v e l so ff o o do u t p u tp e rf o o d
producer than a  that are associated with the adoption of methods that are more
productive than the one that maximises leisure time.24 In this Figure, the gray
area indicates the intervals of technologies and food outputs at which the non-
food sector covers more than compensation and redistribution costs.25 Figure
3 also reveals that technical stagnation is followed by a technical revolution.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper investigates the shift in food procurement technology from leisurely
foraging methods to time-costly farming techniques. On the face of it, hunters
and gatherers’ reluctance towards farming arises because individuals value leisure
and so have no interest in spending more time in food procurement than is nec-
essary in order to fulﬁl their food needs.
In the traditional view the adoption of agriculture is forced by external
changes, such as climatic or demographic pressure. But evidence shows that
agriculture was adopted even in the absence of such changes. The main theo-
retical result in this paper, therefore, is that neither climatic nor demographic
changes are needed to have hunters and gatherers embarking upon leisure-
decreasing methods of food procurement. Organizational changes leading to
the introduction of non-food specialists, driven by exogenous improvements in
food procurement technology, suﬃces to trigger the shift to farming.
This result carries an important message with regard to economic growth. If
the adoption of more productive food procurement methods went hand in hand
with the emergence of non-food specialists, the rise of agriculture bore the seeds
for the later process of industrialisation and thus for economic growth.
Unfortunately, as the model does not allow for demographic changes, it is
incapable of explaining the rise in population densities that appears to have
23It should also be evident from Figure 2 that the size of the redistribution costs inﬂuences
the outcome. Lower costs, corresponding to an upward movement of the ms (a ,A,N) − π
curve, decrease the period of technical stagnation and widen the range of methods that are
adoptable (i.e., (−µπ,επ) > 0). Thus, the smaller the costs of redistribution, the earlier is
the introduction of non-food specialists. By contrast, higher costs of redistribution increase
the period of technical stagnation and reduce the range of methods that are adoptable. In
fact, redistribution costs may be so large that they completely prevent the introduction of
leisure-decreasing methods. This is the case when the supply curve minus π is below the
compensation curve at all levels of leisure-decreasing methods (i.e., π >   π + δ). Under such
circumstances, the leisure-maximising method is the optimal choice, despite the presence of
methods that are far more productive.
24Figure 2, which holds at = a , is simply a cross section of Figure 3.
25Note that the pareto improvement areas in Figures 2 and 3 (the shaded zones) represent
a potential increase in the size of the community’s population (i.e., its population density), as
these areas imply that units of food can be taken from the non-food sector in order to support
a larger population at no cost to standards of living.
19accompanied the adoption of agriculture in the Stone Age. Although the pareto
improvement areas (the shaded areas) in Figures 2 and 3 indicate that units
of food can be taken from the non-food sector in order to support a larger
population at no cost to standards of living, endogenising population growth
would signiﬁcantly improve the model.26
26Olsson (2003), who’s model deals speciﬁcally with demographic changes in relation to the
rise of agriculture, is able to show that once farming has been introduced, population growth
accelerates and more and more people enter the sector of agriculture, even though this infers
declining standards of living.
206 Proof of Lemma 1
With (mc
a,m c
aa) > 0 and (ms
a,−ms
aa) > 0, it follows that if, evaluated at
at = a, ∂ms (at,B∗ (a,N),N)/∂at > ∂mc (at,B∗ (a,N),N)/∂at, then there
exists a unique level of food output per food producer, a  > a, that solves
the problem maxat ms (at,B∗ (a,N),N) − mc (at,B∗ (a,N),N),i nw h i c hc a s e
there exists a unique positive level of redistribution costs,   π > 0,a tw h i c h
ms (a ,B∗ (a,N),N)−   π = mc (a ,B∗ (a,N),N). (Figure 1 should provide the































where ρ ≡ φ(αφγ)−αγ/(1+αγ) +( αφγ)1/(1+αγ). The slope of the supply curve,



















































that is, when N<σ(ξ1),w h e r eξ1 =( αγφ)1/(1+αγ)/νρ2, which we have as-
sumed.
7 Proof of Proposition 1
It follows from equations (12) and (13) that (mc
l,m s
l) < 0.T h ee ﬀect on the sup-
ply of non-food goods, ms
t, and on demand for compensation, mc
t, of a change
in the level of technology, Bt, depends on the eﬀect that this change has on
the individual’s leisure time, lt.S i n c eB∗ is the leisure-maximising method, it
follows that lB ≶ 0 when Bt ≷ B∗.S i n c e (mc
l,m s
l) < 0, it thus follows that
(mc
B,m s
B) ≷ 0 when Bt ≷ B∗. Note that using the food market equilibrium (i.e.,
the fact that atNF
t = aN), the leisure-maximising method, equation (11), can







α)1/1+αγ ≡ B∗ (at,N),w h e r e
(B∗
a,B∗
N) > 0.T h u s ,f o rBt <B ∗ (a ,N), (mc
B (a ,B t,N),m s
B (a ,B t,N)) < 0.
21It follows from Lemma 2 that ms (a ,B∗ (a,N),N)−  π = mc (a ,B∗ (a,N),N).
Thus, if, evaluated at Bt = B∗ (a,N) <B ∗ (a ,N), |∂mc (a ,B t,N)/∂Bt| >
|∂ms (a ,B t,N)/∂B|, then there must be some At >B ∗ (a,N),a tw h i c hms (a ,A t,N)−
  π >m c (a ,A t,N). (Figure 2 should provide the intuition.) It thus follows that
there exists a positive constant δ > 0 and π ∈ (  π,  π + δ), and functions µ = µ(π)
with µπ < 0 and ε = ε(π) with επ > 0,w h e r eµ(  π + δ)=ε(  π + δ), such that for
At ∈ (B∗ (a,N)+ε(  π),B∗ (a,N)+µ(  π)), ms (a ,A t,N) − π >m c (a ,A t,N).
(See Figure 2.) For any at > a (and thus especially for at = a ), the slope of
the compensation curve, evaluated at Bt = B∗ (a,N),i s
∂mc(at,Bt,N)
∂Bt




























For any at > a, the slope of the supply curve, evaluated at Bt = B∗ (a,N),i s
∂ms(at,Bt,N)
∂Bt
















Evaluated at Bt = B∗ (a,N), the absolute slope of the compensation curve








































For at > a, it follows that 1 > (1 − a)/at and that l(at,B∗ (a,N),N) <
l(a,B∗ (a,N),N). Thus, evaluated at Bt = B∗ (a,N), the absolute slope of








that is, when σ(ξ2) <N,w h e r eξ2 =1 /νρ, which we have assumed.
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Figure 3: Leisure-Decreasing Technologies.
27